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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1923, a group of lawyers, judges, and teachers met to con-
sider the desirability of forming the American Law Institute ("ALP)
and of undertaking its ongoing project of restating the law. They
began their deliberations with the recognition that the legal system
had serious failings' and that the public was generally dissatisfied
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. B.A. 1968 Wellesley College; M.A. 1973,
Ph.D. 1981, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1976, Harvard Law School I would like to
thank my research assistant Matthew Foye and also the Boston College Law School summer
research grant program for its financial support.
1. Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the In-
promnment of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an Anerican Law Institute, 1 A.LI. PROC.
1 (1923).
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and skeptical about the justice it dispensed. 2 The central difficulty
with the system of justice, they thought, was the fact that legal out-
comes were so uncertain. Uncertainty, they argued, made the legal
system cumbersome, expensive and inaccessible; it denied justice to
litigants3 and discouraged legitimate activities. 4 The reasons for
this uncertainty were many. Among them, the prospectus noted:
the lack of agreement among the members of the legal profession on the funda-
mental principles of the common law, lack of precision in the use of legal terms,
conflicting and badly drawn statutory provisions .... the great volume of recorded
decisions, the ignorance of judges and lawyers and the number and nature of novel
legal cases.5
These were understood to be serious problems, but, as seri-
ous as they were, the solution seemed right at hand. After all, these
were precisely the kinds of problems that a group of well inten-
tioned and capable lawyers might effectively address. What was
needed, they thought, was an opportunity for the "best" lawyers to
work together in an atmosphere that was free from the need to rep-
resent the interests of particular clients. Freed of partisan inter-
ests, the participants would be able to use objective measures of
rational discourse to find agreement, develop precision, and clarify
legal doctrines. The result would be a series of restatements that
would rally the legal community around correct statements of legal
principle. 6
In 1923, these hopes became a reality with the founding of
the American Law Institute and its sponsorship of the ongoing ef-
fort to "restate" American law. Since its founding, the ALI has con-
2. Such dissatisfaction, they thought, was serious; it bred "disrespect for law" and they
worried that such disrespect would become the "corner stone of revolution." Id.
3. Indeed, they were emphatic about the relationship between uncertainty and injustice.
When the law is doubtful most persons are inclined to adopt the view most fa-
vorable to their own interests; and many are willing if necessary to test the
matter in court while those willing to overreach their neighbors are encouraged
to delay performing their obligations until some court has passed on all tho
novel legal theories which skilled ingenuity can invent to show that they need
not be perfomed.
Id. at 6.
4. Uncertainty discouraged activity because it made it difficult for people to assess true li-
ability costs. This difficulty was noted in the prospectus: "Because of the existing uncertainty in
the law those who turn to it for guidance in conduct often find that it speaks with a doubtful
voice." Id.
5. Id. at8.
6. They described the Restatement this way:
We speak of the work which the organization should undertake as a restate-
ment; its object should not only be to help make certain much that is now un-
certain and to simplify unnecessary complexities, but also to promote those
changes which will tend better to adapt the laws to the needs of life.
Id. at 14.
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sistently addressed the subject area of tort law.7 While these efforts
have accomplished much that is worthwhile,8 they have fallen short
of their stated goal. In fact, the problems of the tort system today
bear a remarkable resemblance to those that were articulated in
1923. Thus, for all the careful restating, the tort system remains
steeped in controversy and vulnerable to the twin charges of uncer-
tainty and injustice.
The continuing problem of uncertainty is hardly surprising.
By its very nature, tort law involves accidental and unexpected in-
juries, and these injuries often provoke an emotional and conflicted
response. On the one hand, we view tort plaintiffs with considerable
sympathy. On the other, their predicaments also inspire a certain
amount of fear. Tales about unexpected injuries remind us of our
own vulnerability to sudden catastrophe. Blaming the victim can
work to appease this fear by seeming to reassure us that continued
vigilance can prevent sudden harm. The conflict between these two
feelings-sympathy for the plaintiff and fear of our own vulnerabil-
ity-can produce ambivalence, and, I suspect, this is one of the rea-
sons why the system seems to reach so many irreconcilable out-
comes. For example, the system is sometimes remarkably generous
to plaintiffs:
A man drowns in a motel swimming pool. His family is able to recover from the
motel owner whose only fault was a failure to post a sign stating the obvious fact
that there was no lifeguard in attendance. 9
At other times, it seems downright parsimonious:
A woman is raped in a motel room that has no phone and no security of any kind.
The jury found the woman to be 97% negligent because she opened the door in the
middle of the night. At the same time, they found the motel owner, who did not
even warn her that the neighborhood was dangerous, only 3% negligent.'9
Of course, it is true that these cases rest upon different doctrinal
grounds and that they are not, strictly speaking, inconsistent. Even
so, they illustrate something important about the unpredictability
of tort law. Tort law is not unpredictable because of doctrinal incon-
7. Volumes of the Restatement of Torts were published in 1934, 1938, and 1939. Volumes of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts were published in 1955, 1965, 1977, and 1979. Twenty three
appendices were compiled from 1963 to 1991. In addition, two sections of the Third Restatement
were published in 1998 and 2000.
8. The Restaternents have been especially important in terms of narrowing the issues and
focusing debate. They have also played a major role in rationalizing discussions of tort doctrine
for lawyers and judges who may not have time to rethink every research question from the
ground up.
9. See Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465, 468 (Cal. 1970).
10. See Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1989).
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sistency; instead, the inconsistency arises from the wide array of
conflicting feelings that tort cases excite. Given these feelings, it is
unlikely that the solution will be achieved simply by developing
more doctrinal clarity.
It is also not surprising that the perceived injustices in tort
outcomes are the subject of continuing criticism. Tort law creates
winners and losers under circumstances that make losing particu-
larly hard to understand and reconcile. Not only must the loser pay
money, (s)he must come to terms with the fact that society has laid
the blame at her doorstep. For most of us, this would be a bitter pill
to swallow even under the best of circumstances, but the accidental
nature of most tort injuries makes these circumstances even more
difficult. Accidents are the kind of unplanned and unexpected oc-
currences that inevitably upset the fragile balance we maintain be-
tween self and others. For example, drivers would normally expect
to pay for the oil and gas that they consume, but not necessarily for
the bumpers and fenders that accidentally get in their way. Simi-
larly, the executives at McDonalds undoubtedly anticipated many
expenses when they decided to sell coffee from drive-thru windows,
but they probably never imagined that they would have to pay mil-
lions of dollars for doing nothing more than serving the coffee pip-
ing hot." Because such costs are unexpected and hard to avoid, pro-
defendant critics often argue that the tort system is far too gener-
ous. Armed with a long parade of seemingly outrageous and exces-
sive verdicts, they argue for strict constraints on tort decision-
making. At stake, they suggest, is fundamental fairness as well as
the freedom of individuals to engage in legitimate and worthwhile
activities.' 2
From the plaintiffs' perspective, however, the tort system is
not nearly generous enough. While a handful of tort plaintiffs seem
to win the lawsuit lottery with multimillion dollar verdicts, many
worthy plaintiffs go without any form of remedy. 18 Instead, their
11. There was a suit in New Mexico (Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.TS., Inc.) that
produced a widely publicized jury verdict of approximately three million dollars, but there was
no published opinion since the case was settled before appeal. The case is referenced at McMa.
hon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 1998).
12. Indeed, there are cases of public fireworks displays cancelled, and public festivals short-
ened. Robert Hanley, Insurance Costs Imperil Recreation Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1986, at
Al. There are also cases of public ice skating rinks closed, and even ministers who will not go to
parishioners homes to advise them and all for fear of lawsuits and inability to afford liability
insurance. Robert Lindsey, Businesses Change Ways in Fear of Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
1985, at Al.
13. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443,
445 (1987).
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claims may be frustrated in any number of ways. The suit may be
barred by the statute of limitations before they even realize that
they have a claim. They may be unable to bear the expense and dif-
ficulty of litigation. They may not be able to find an attorney who
will take the case on a contingency basis. They may have to accept
an inadequate settlement because litigation takes too long. Once in
court, insoluble proof problems may result from the accidental na-
ture of the incident. They may also confront arbitrary limitations on
their rights of recovery that have been created by past generations
of tort "reform." Finally, if they recover, they may find that what
they receive in damages is a gross under-valuation of their loss.
From every side, then, the tort system seems to be in disar-
ray. Whether you are pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant, you are likely
to see the system as irrational, illegitimate, and woefully inade-
quate. There is over-deterrence of some activities and under-
deterrence of others. Some injuries receive too much compensation
and others receive too little. Further, these variations create addi-
tional problems in reaching fair settlements and in pricing and in-
suring risks. Thus, it seems obvious that the tort system could use
the kind of conceptual housecleaning that was prescribed in 1923.
The new restatement, 14 the General Principles of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, presents one kind of solution to this problem, but
there are others. As an alternative, one could attempt to rationalize
and justify the system by conforming it to the dictates of an accept-
able normative theory. Or, as I have suggested elsewhere, 15 one
could try to develop a more pragmatic approach.
The purpose of this Paper is to explore these alternatives
and to think more generally about the following question: How can
lawyers and law teachers use their expertise to improve the tort
system? In Section II, I examine the Restatement approach. Next, in
Section III, I examine the various normative theories of tort law.
These theories typically articulate a particular goal-a goal like
efficiency or fairness-and then use this goal as a way of discrimi-
nating between correct and incorrect outcomes. Thus, they purport
to provide a justificatory framework for tort adjudication. Finally,
Section IV takes up the quest for a more pragmatic approach. It
begins with a realistic appraisal of current tort practices. It then
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES, (Council Draft No. 1, 1998);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1998);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES, (Discussion Draft Apr. 5, 1999) [herein-
after Discussion Draft].
15. See generally Catharine Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification
for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L REV. 2348 (1990).
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analyzes whether these practices could be changed in order to bet-
ter serve their intended function.
II. THE RESTATEMENT APPROACH
In 1998, the American Law Institute began the long process
of restating the general principles of tort law.16 The aim of the proj-
ect was to clarify basic concepts by providing a "vocabulary not only
for the whole of tort law but also for tort law principles in their ap-
plication to other fields."'17 Notably, this purpose is significantly less
ambitious than the one articulated in 1923. While there is still an
emphasis on doctrinal clarity, the Foreword to the Restatement
(Third) reflects little hope that the project will facilitate the ad-
ministration of justice by providing uniformity of law and certainty
of outcomes. The goal is no longer to precisely restate correct rules
but rather to separate the wheat from the chaff; to boil down the
"thousands of judicial decisions .... hundreds of law review articles
and commentaries . . . [and] legal sources ... [that] span the legal
spectrum from theoretical analys[e]s . . . to the workaday concepts
of jury instructions" 8 to a few manageable concepts.
In examining the Restatement (Third), it is important to
keep in mind that negligence doctrine has never consisted of the
kind of rules that can make outcomes seem predictable and certain.
The central issue in a negligence case is the defendant's breach of
due care. Traditionally, due care has been described as that degree
of care that would be exercised by "a reasonable and prudent per-
son"'19 or by "an ordinarily prudent person" 20 under the same or
similar circumstances. Note that these definitions use a variety of
general normative terms such as "reasonable," "ordinary," and
"prudent." These terms leave the jury such wide discretion that
Leon Green's statement in 1930 seems particularly insightful:
"[W]e may have a process for passing judgment in negligence cases,
but practically no 'law of negligence' beyond the process itself."'21
This emphasis on process, together with a corresponding thinness
in substantive doctrine, is a distinctive feature of the tort law and
16. See supra note 14.
17. Discussion Draft, supra note 14, at xi.
18. Id.
19. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (2001).
20. Gossett v. Jackson, 249 Va. 549, 554, 457 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1995) (quoted in DOBBS, supra
note 19, at n.5).
21. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 185 (1930).
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one that must be kept in mind when considering the Restatement
(Third)'s announced strategy of "selection by exclusion."2
A good example of this strategy is found in the section on
negligence.2 3 The duty of care is described as "reasonable," but
terms such as "ordinary" and "prudent" are omitted. The section
then proceeds to identify what it calls the primary factors:
Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether conduct lacks reasonable care
are the foreseeable likelihood that it will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of
the harm that may ensue, and the burden that would be borne by the actor and
others if the actor takes precautions that eliminated or reduce the possibility of
harm.2 4
The overall intent of this section seems to be to narrow the concept
of negligence by emphasizing ("selecting") rational calculation and
by omitting ("excluding") any reference to negligence as the viola-
tion of societal norms. While the primary factor approach does not
necessarily result in predictable outcomes,- it does seem to limit
the range of the decision-maker's discretion by ruling out other
seemingly legitimate factors.
To the extent that the Restatement (Third) actually simpli-
fies negligence by "selecting" rational calculation and "excluding"
societal norms, it represents a radical change from existing law.
Under current practices, the law, in most cases, provides that tort
decision-makers may-but need not-use the measure of rational
calculation to judge negligent conduct.26 Note that even though Sec-
tion Three is exclusively focused on rational calculation, this is not
the full picture. What one hand takes away can be restored with the
other; what the draft simplifies in one section can be confounded in
another. For example, Comment C27 recognizes certain exceptions-
infancy, disability, and emergencies-to the rational calculation
standard28 and also acknowledges that this standard is not the ap-
propriate one to use in cases of inadvertence. 29 In addition to these
22. Discussion Draft, supra note 14, at xi.
23. Id. § 3, xxi.
24. Id. This is, of course, the cost benefit calculation described in United States v. Carroll
Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
25. This is because there can be differences in valuation of many of the items involved, and
because there may be some disagreements as to exactly which precautions would be required.
26. The reporter's notes argue at length that what it calls the "balancing approach' is the
universal standard. But the success of this argument is achieved primarily by the identifying the
use of terms like "reasonable care" and the "care of a prudent person" with the balancing ap-
proach.
27. Discussion Draft, supra note 14, § 3 cmt. c.
28. Id.
29. For example, it indicates that rational calculation may not be the correct approach in
cases where the accident is caused by lapses in the defendant's attention. It states:
2001] 1453
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exceptions, there are separate sections that deal with violations of
custom and statute. Section 11, for example, provides that the exis-
tence of a custom will be relevant but not conclusive evidence of
negligence, 30 and Section 12 provides that, under certain circum-
stances, violation of a statute will be conclusive with respect to a
negligence claim. 31 Thus, while rational calculation is stated to be
the "primary" factor, the draft as a whole maintains the current
practice of allowing the simultaneous use of several different meas-
ures of due care.
In the end, the Restatement (Third)'s account of negligence
deserves much praise. It is both wonderfully comprehensive and
deeply subtle in its handling of the fundamental tensions of tort
law. On the other hand, given that there is little change in the sub-
stantive law or in the analytical framework that supports it, it is,
therefore, hard to see what has been "clarified. ' 32 Tort decision-
makers retain their discretion over tort outcomes, and tort out-
comes thereby remain unpredictable and uncertain. What, then,
has the Restatement (Third) accomplished? This is a hard question
to ask, but it is an important one. Does it really simplify and clarify
the discussion, or does it merely add one more piece of confusing
argumentation? In fact, we need to consider whether a lack of clar-
ity is really the heart of the problem. Perhaps, the tort law is bro-
ken in a way that the Restatement approach cannot easily fix. Re-
statements work best when there is a lot of variation and confusion
in the substantive doctrine,3 3 but this does not seem to be the par-
ticular problem of negligence law. Rather, the problem with negli-
[T]he primary factors are most relevant in cases in which the actor is generally
aware of some risk entailed by conduct yet because of the burden of risk pre-
vention is willing to tolerate that risk. By contrast, in cases in which the actor's
alleged negligence consists mainly in the actor's inattentive failure to advert to
the risk, explicit consideration of the primary factors may be awkward, and the
actor's conduct can best be evaluated by directly applying the standard of the
reasonably careful person.
Id.
30. Id. §11.
31. Id. §12.
32. In fact, there are some ways in which the situation may have become even more con-
fused. Take, for example, the emphasis on rational calculation. It is well known that many of the
cost-benefit factors are not easily quantified. Items such as the defendant's leisure and conven-
ience as well as the plaintiffs pain and suffering do not lend themselves to simple quantification.
One can only hope that the primary factor language will not encourage quantification where
none is fairly possible. In addition, to the extent that Section 3 ignores the issue of societal
norms, one could fear that there will be much less incentive to clarify them and acknowledge
their relevance.
33. Some areas of tort law may well be more amenable to the Restatement approach. The
Institute's recent work on the apportionment of damages would seem to be a good example.
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gence law seems to implicate a somewhat deeper confusion about
the goals and values that underlie the tort system.
III. THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: NORMATIVE THEORY
AS A FOUNDATION FOR TORT LAW
In the past thirty years, one of the most popular ways of
thinking about tort law has been to consider it in the context of a
larger normative theory. Whether the larger theory speaks in terms
of economics or moral philosophy, these attempts share a common
strategy. The theorist begins by identifying a particular virtue as
the ultimate goal of the tort system. For example, one common goal
is the virtue of efficiency. This goal is then used as a means of dis-
tinguishing between correct and incorrect legal outcomes.34 When
successful, this strategy not only provides a guide for tort decision-
making, it also provides a justification for tort decisions insofar as
they are made in accordance with the theory. Thus, the approach
provides a comprehensive theory of tort law-we know both what
courts should do and why they should do it. For a theory to be com-
prehensive in this sense, it must meet two criteria: first, the stated
goal must unambiguously determine a particular outcome in the
vast majority of cases, and second, the goal must be understood to
be an unequivocal good. Failing either of these criteria means that
the theory will not work as a systematic justification of tort out-
comes. A theory that fails these criteria may, nonetheless, yield im-
portant insights, or it may provide some measure of justification in
some individual cases. What it cannot do, however, is justify or ra-
tionalize the system as a whole, and failing this, it is unable to pro-
vide a clear and coherent basis for improving tort law.
Prominent among the goals that the various normative theo-
ries of tort law have identified for tort law are corrective justice,
efficiency, and fairness. Each of these goals has been used to de-
velop a comprehensive theory of the kind I have described above.
34. Or, more accurately, they regulate the selection of the correct legal rule, which in turn
mandates particular outcomes. Thus, each of these theories is rule based in the sense that it
endorses certain rules and then uses these rules to determine outcomes.
2001] 1455
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A. Corrective Justice3 5
The emergence of negligence doctrine in the nineteenth cen-
tury placed the concept of fault at the center of judgments about
tort liability. Under negligence doctrine, the general rule is that
plaintiffs could recover upon a showing that the defendant was at
fault and that the defendant's fault caused the plaintiffs harm. The
equation between fault and tort liability thus created a rational and
tidy framework for tort law-one that makes it plausible to see the
tort system as an instrument of corrective justice.8 6
Much of what makes the tort system seem legitimate and
logical is the fact that it most often shifts accident costs in cases
where it is possible to argue that the defendant has done something
wrong. Nevertheless, when fault is used as the basis for a compre-
hensive theory, the resulting theory generally fails to meet the cri-
teria established above. One reason for this is that the concept of
fault has no fixed meaning. There are, indeed, many different
things that might be meant when we say that a tort defendant was
"at fault." First, it could mean that (s)he was vicious in the sense
that (s)he actually intended to inflict personal injury on the defen-
dant. Or, second, (s)he might have been selfish. Perhaps (s)he
wanted something so badly that (s)he was willing to inflict a severe
injury upon the defendant in order to get it. Third, (s)he might have
been heedless-(s)he loved taking risks even when (or especially
when) a bad outcome might be inflicted on others. Fourth, (s)he
might have been merely careless; perhaps (s)he overlooked some
precautions or did them haphazardly. Fifth, (s)he might have been
inattentive or distracted. Maybe (s)he was daydreaming, or maybe
(s)he just "spaced out" at the crucial moment. Sixth, (s)he might
have employed bad judgment; (s)he underestimated the probability
or severity of a harmful outcome or overestimated the burden (s)he
would incur in avoiding it. Seventh, (s)he might have broken the
law. Eighth, (s)he might have deviated from the normal way of do-
ing things for whatever reason. Ninth, (s)he might merely have
profited from a risk generating activity. And so forth.
35. For examples of corrective justice theories, see Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of
Torts: Their Scope and Limits, (Part 2), 2 LAW & PHIL. 5, (1983) and Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a
Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37, (1983).
36. The phrase comes from Aristotle's Nichontachean Ethics. The basic idea is that when
one party wrongfully deprives another of some benefit, the wrongdoer must compensate the
victim.
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A PRAGMATIC APPROACH
This flexibility in the concept of fault is one of the chief rea-
sons why the link between liability and fault has rarely been chal-
lenged. Thus, many theorists have argued that fault is the touch-
stone of tort liability.3 7 It should be noted, however, that this flexi-
bility in the concept of fault poses real difficulties for fault-based
comprehensive theories. Such theories have problems meeting the
first criterion-unambiguous endorsement of results-because they
do not utilize a unitary and consistent concept of fault.38 Further,
they cannot meet the second criterion-general acceptance of the
goal in question-because there is no general agreement as to
which of these concepts of fault justifies shifting tort losses. 39 Fur-
ther, any attempt to meet the first criterion, by accepting a more
precise definition of fault, will make it more difficult to meet the
second requirement by making the concept of fault less amenable to
general agreement.40 Thus, while corrective justice theories remind
us that blaming the defendant can be an important part of tort li-
ability, they do not provide the kind of comprehensive picture that
would give credibility to the tort system or to efforts for its reform.
B. Efficiency41
In the last Section, we saw that the Restatement (Third)
utilizes a cost benefit approach as the "primary factor" in assessing
negligence liability. In so doing, it reflects the dominant tradition in
analyzing tort liability over the last twenty years. The foundation of
this approach is contained in the recognition that the reasonable
person will not take every possible precaution. A reasonable ap-
37. For example, Holmes writes, "No case or principle can be found, or if found can be main-
tamined, subjecting an individual to liability for an act done without fault on his part.... All the
cases concede that an injury arising from inevitable accident, or, which in law or reason is the
same thing, from an act that ordinary human care and foresight are unable to guard against, is
but the misfortune of the sufferer, and lays no foundation for legal responsibility. OLIVER IV.
HOLTES, JR&, THE COMMON LAW 94-95 (1881) (quoting the language of "the late Chief Justice
Nelson of New York").
38. The exception, of course, is Ernest Weinrib's effort to utilize Kantian moral theory to
help us decide when the defendant's conduct is wrongful. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW 84-113 (1995). Weinrib's approach, however, relies upon the possibility of turning
Kants moral system into a detailed practical guide to moral action. While this might be at-
tempted, it is doubtful that such an interpretation of Kant's moral system could be either univer-
sally approved or proved to be correct. See infra text accompanying note 39.
39. For more on this problem, see Wells, supra note 15, at 2364-75.
40. See Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984).
41. For examples of theories of this kind, see WILLIAM x. LANDES & RIcHARD A. POS'ER,
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) and GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AcciD&%7s
(1970).
2001] 1457
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
proach, it is assumed, requires that tort defendants take only those
precautions that are efficient in the sense that they produce safety
savings that exceed their costs.
Like the notion of negligence as fault, the efficiency standard
has three distinct characteristics. First, it seems to apply in every
case. If we are willing to cost out such things as minor increments
of time, increased attention, bodily injuries, pain and suffering and
even loss of human life, then, at least in principle, every case can be
resolved by using the economic approach. Second, like the fault
standard, the efficiency standard has great flexibility. Issues about
what we count and how we count it may be resolved in many differ-
ent ways. We could, for example, maintain that a human life is
nearly priceless or, on the other hand, argue that, for liability pur-
poses, it should be valued (as it is for damages) by the economic loss
to the survivors. Third, the efficiency standard has its own built-in
justification. Promoting efficiency, like facilitating justice, is itself a
good thing. 42 Efficiency gains translate to welfare gains and, pre-
sumably, to gains in happiness and satisfaction.
On the surface, efficiency theories seem like they could work
as comprehensive theories of tort law. Unlike corrective justice
theories, they have an air of mathematical precision that suggests
the availability of a correct economic answer for each tort case. The
problem, however, is that the air of precision is somewhat decep-
tive. An efficiency theory will actually be precise only if it assigns a
specific monetary value to each element of the cost-benefit calculus.
In short, it must be able to say in each case how much human time,
human attention, human suffering and human life are worth. Obvi-
ously, such valuations can be quite controversial. For example,
while most might agree that there is an upside limit to the amount
we should spend to save a human life, it is unlikely that we can
reach any agreement as to what, in dollar terms, that amount
might be. If, however, an economic theory does not commit itself to
an unambiguous theory of valuation, then it cannot unambiguously
endorse specific outcomes. So long as the cost-benefit formula can-
not be turned into a real mathematical calculus, theorists can only
speculate as to what efficiency requires, and so long as there are
ambiguities in the worth of human time, attention, and injury, no
calculation will be possible in the vast majority of cases. Thus, like
42. The efficiency standard, however, is not without controversy. While many would agree
that, all things being equal, efficiency is a good thing, fewer would be satisfied that it is the sine
qua non for shifting accidental losses.
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corrective justice theories, efficiency theories are unable to meet
both of the criteria. If, on the one hand, the manner of calculation is
determinate enough to provide clear answers, then, on the other
hand, it will be too controversial to act as a comprehensive justifica-
tion for tort law.
C. Fairness
The fairness approach has at least two different forms. One
form centers on a substantive notion of fairness. A second focuses
on community standards.
1. Substantive Fairness
This approach is best exemplified by the work of George
Fletcher.43 Fletcher proceeds from two assumptions: one, that there
is a background level of reciprocal risk which we all agree to share,
and two, that the tort law will not intervene in cases where the
plaintiffs injuries were a product of this background level of risk.
Thus, he argues:
A victim has a right to recover for injuries caused by a risk greater in degree and
different in order from those created by the victim and imposed on the defendant-
in short for injuries resulting from non-reciprocal risks.44
By rationalizing tort liability in terms of reciprocal risk, Fletcher is
able to recast the theoretical foundations of tort law from their
roots in the concept of fault to a more modern conception of fairness
and equality.45
One problem with Fletcher's theory, as a comprehensive the-
ory,46 is that it is too abstract to provide us with much guidance in
difficult cases. This is because the concept of reciprocity is hard to
apply:
If one man owns a dog, and his neighbor a cat, the risks presumably offset each
other. But if one man drives a car, and the other rides a bicycle? Of if one plays
baseball in the street and the other hunts quail in the woods behind his house? No
two people do exactly the ame things. 47
43. See George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L REV. 537 (1972).
44. Id. at 542.
45. Specifically, Fletcher's concept of reciprocity is linked to a Roslyn conception of fairness.
See JOHN RAWiS, A THEORY OF JUSTIcE (1971); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, PHIL REV., Apr.
1958, at 67(2):164-94.
46. See supra text accompanying note 33.
47. Fletcher, supra note 43, at 572.
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Given these difficulties in application, it is obvious that Fletcher's
theory will fail the first criterion-it cannot determine an unambi-
guous outcome in the vast majority of cases.48 Despite this, the the-
ory does have an impressive amount of explanatory force. It sheds
insight on the nature of negligence liability, its relationship to the
various pockets of strict liability and the underlying values of the
tort system. The difficulty, however, is that it is not comprehensive;
from a decision-maker's point of view, it seems to add but one more
layer of analysis to a rhetorical field that is already overcrowded
with tests and standards.
2. Community Standards of Fairness
Rather than appealing to fairness as an abstract concept, we
might see the goal of fairness in a more concrete way. Specifically,
we could see the tort system as enforcing publicly recognized stan-
dards of fairness. In an earlier article, I developed this view by ar-
guing that the fault theory of tort liability was too narrow:
It is fair, of course, to force a blameworthy defendant to pay for injuries he has
caused. But it is also fair.., to shift losses under other less blameworthy circum.
stances. This expanded conception of fairness is based on the common sense idea
that people should not be blamed for engaging in certain kinds of conduct so long
as they assume financial responsibility for the harms they cause to others. 49
Thus, I argued, the central question for tort liability should be: Is it
fair, all things considered, to require the defendant to pay for the
plaintiffs injuries?
This notion of fairness, however, is substantially different
from the one that animates Fletcher's theory. For Fletcher, fairness
is a question of reciprocity, equality, and choices that might have
been made in the initial position. For me, it is something less ab-
stract. Fairness may be the dominant goal of the tort system, but
the system itself does not utilize a general theory of fairness in de-
ciding individual cases. Instead, it relies upon the ordinary intui-
tions of ordinary decision-makers to decide, in each individual case,
what fairness requires. We can, in short, understand the procedures
of tort law as a way of applying community standards. In effect, the
members of the jury operate as a kind of sampling mechanism. As
proxies for the community, they receive the evidence, hear the ar-
48. As Fletcher states: "Mhe judgments require use of metaphors and images-a way of
thinking that hardly commends itself as precise and scientific." Id.
49. Wells, supra note 15, at 2359.
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guments, listen to the judge's instructions, discuss the case with
one another, and reach a consensus decision with respect to the
particular facts at hand. In reaching their conclusion, they speak
for the community, and in most cases, the tort system treats this
result as determinative. 50
Standing alone, the community conception of fairness does
not qualify as a comprehensive theory of tort liability. By its very
nature, the community concept is indeterminate with respect to tort
outcomes. This is because the standard will beget nothing but con-
troversy so long as it is considered in the abstract and without a
specific set of practices for determining community sentiment.
When, however, the abstract conception is supplemented by the
idea that the community standard of fairness is whatever the jury
says it is, the standard will be determinate, but it may not neces-
sarily represent an unequivocal good. This is because outcomes that
are obtained in accordance with current tort practices may be "fair"
in the specialized sense described above, but this does not entail
that they are "fair" in the laudatory sense of the word.51
D. The Limits of Normative Theorizing
There can be no question that the normative theories dis-
cussed in this Section have enriched both tort law and tort theory.
My point has been merely to underscore the fact that they do not
provide a comprehensive basis for legal decision-making. Conse-
quently, they are inadequate as a prescription for improving the
tort system. Nor is this lack of comprehensiveness a simple matter
of imperfect theorizing. Rather, we need to recognize that it is basi-
cally impossible for an abstract theory to determine practical out-
comes without the help of concrete decision-making practices and
real human decision-makers. 52 The interaction of these two fac-
tors-theory and practice-determines the effectiveness of the sys-
tem. Both are essential. Tort practice frames the issues that tort
theory must address. In turn, tort theory provides tort practice with
50. I have greatly oversimplified in this brief description. There are obviously instances
when the point of the judge's instructions is to preclude the application of jury's own conception
of fairness. Directed verdicts, special verdicts, and j.n.o.v.'s are also used, in some cases, to sec-
ond guess the jury's normative conclusions. As I argue in the next Section, the notion of commu-
nity standards does not make too much sense independent of a specific procedure for determin-
ing what they are.
51. Recognizing this distinction is crucial because the practice of labelling certain outcomes
as "fair" relative to a practice should not foreclose an inquiry into the merits of that practice.
52. See generally Catharine Wells, Situated Decisionniaking, 63 S.C. L. REV. 1727 (1990).
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a common culture and vocabulary. Tort practice, however, is also
affected by a host of other practical and emotional considerations.
Thus, the role of theory in reforming the system is not to ask de
novo: What is the highest good that could be served by the tort sys-
tem? Rather, its role is to function as a critique of tort practice. In
this vein, we might ask: What is the point of the practice? Does it
work? Does it serve the needs of the people who use it? What frus-
trates it operation? Is there anything about the practice that needs
clarification? Who does it disappoint? Whose interests are not ade-
quately counted? And, finally, are there tort cases where we should
not invoke the practice at all?
What I am suggesting here is that contemporary tort theory
has had its costs as well as its benefits. On the plus side, we may
count an increased understanding of the economic and moral foun-
dations of tort law and the abstract clarity that this understanding
has brought to substantive tort doctrines. On the negative side,
however, tort theory has obscured some very important features of
tort law and led to an increasing sense that tort theory has little to
do with the real problems that plague the tort system. In the next
Section, I will outline a more pragmatic approach-one that might
serve to refocus discussion on some of these important questions.
IV. REEXAMINING TORT THEORY AND PRACTICE
Once we acknowledge the interdependence of theory and
practice, then it becomes clear that the place to begin our analysis
is with a realistic appraisal of contemporary tort practice. Doing
this, we find that tort practices are essentially bifurcated-some
tort cases are settled through an administrative system, 53 while
others are resolved through the courts.5 4 Of the latter group, most
cases are settled prior to trial and only a few continue to a court-
imposed final judgment. Much torts scholarship has focused on the
resolution of cases through the court system and, in particular, on
defining legal doctrine and its application to individual cases. There
is, however, little collective wisdom addressing the relative merits
53. For example, each state has some version of a Workmen's Compensation Statute under
which recoveries for workplace accidents are funneled through an administrative agency or a
specialized court system. Another example is the growing use of binding arbitration to resolve
medical malpractice claims.
54. As a kind of hybrid, there is also the phenomenon of mass torts-tort cases involving
large numbers of plaintiffs whose cases are aggregated for some or all of the legal process. See,
e.g., Deborah Hensler & Mark Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A So.
cio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961 (1993).
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of administrative and legal remedies; certainly, this would be a
fruitful area for further research.
When we focus on the court system, we find that the jury re-
solves most of the substantive issues in tort cases. Tort juries gen-
erally consist of six to twelve ordinary citizens who have been cho-
sen at random.55 Their decision must be the result of group delib-
eration and consensus judgment.6 While the judge instructs the
jury on the law, these instructions tend to be vague; 57 indeed, most
tort instructions seem to do little beyond enumerating a number of
common sense factors that the jury might apply. 8 While jury deci-
sion-making leads to a certain amount of unpredictability, it also
has certain advantages that make it particularly appropriate for
adjudicating tort cases.
I noted in the beginning that the paradigm tort case is an ac-
cident case that involves personal injury to the plaintiff. Physical
evidence may be sparse; testimonial evidence may be conflicting;
and perceptions may be scattered and disorganized. In addition, the
case may inspire intense and conflicting emotion not only among
the parties, but also among those who hear the story. This means
that resolving the case is more than just a bookkeeping matter. It is
difficult for a resolution to seem fair when there is no apparently
objective measure of the facts. It is also hard to deal realistically
with the feelings of sympathy and fear that these cases inspire.
Jury resolution of such cases can address both these issues.
The first issue--differing perceptions about the basic facts of
the accident-is addressed by the fact that the issue is not resolved
55. While juries have traditionally consisted of twelve jurors, in IWilliams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 102-03 (1970), the Supreme Court ruled that six member juries are constitutional in
criminal cases. Later, in Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973), the Supreme Court ex-
tended six member juries to civil trials. However, the court firmly established this lower limit in
Ballew v. Georgia, 453 U.S. 223, 243 (1978), ruling that juries of less than six members violate
the Sixth Amendment's representative requirement. See J. Clark Kelso, Jury System Improve-
ment, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 1433, 1488-89 (1996).
56. Regarding the deliberative function of a jury, the Supreme Court stated in Williams
that the jury's importance "lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen," and further that a jury should "be large enough to
promote group deliberation." Williams, 399 U.S. at 100.
57. For an extended discussion of the vagueness of tort instructions and the resulting
breadth ofjury discretion, see Wells, supra note 15, at 2386-89.
58. For example, the emergency instruction used in Wilson v. Sibert, 535 P.2d 1034, 1039
n.11 (Alaska 1975), tells the jury that "a person who, without negligence on his part, is suddenly
and unexpectedly confronted with peril arising from either the actual presence of, or the appear-
ance oft imminent danger to himself or to others, is not expected nor required to use the same
judgment and prudence that is required of him in the exercise of ordinary care in calmer and
more deliberate moments." See also MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT CML JURY INMSTRUCTONS
§ 2.1.10 (Res Ipsa Loquitur).
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by a single decision-maker. The plaintiff says: "You were driving too
fast." The defendant says: "You got in the way." With a single deci-
sion-maker, the suspicion is great that the case is decided because
that decision-maker, for whatever reason, identifies with-and
adopts the viewpoint of-one of the parties. With a jury, this is a far
less likely perception. Individual jurors will see the case from dif-
fering perspectives, and a joint resolution will only be possible once
they have engaged in a group process of sorting through the facts of
the case. 59
The second issue-the need to sort through feelings of sym-
pathy and fear in order to reach a reasonable outcome-is also ad-
dressed by the group deliberation process. Some jurors may sympa-
thize with the plaintiff; some may have fears that lead them to
blame the victim. With a single decision-maker, these feelings may
be decisive, but in group discussions, a more reasoned discourse
may emerge. The nature of the judge's instructions reinforces this
result. Not only do such instructions focus on such non-emotive
standards as the reasonable person and the concept of due care, but
they also are rife with the language of rational debate and delibera-
tion.60 The result of this procedure is a verdict that seems less emo-
tionally biased and that also seems to restore a certain amount of
order to what had earlier seemed to be a chaotic and uncontrollable
situation.
Once we have identified an essential feature of tort adjudica-
tion and enumerated its advantages, it is possible to think about it
in a more pragmatic and functional way. Thus, for example, we be-
gin with the notion that an important feature of the tort system is
its substitution of jury discretion for more binding technical legal
rules. We also recognize that the group decision-making approach
has certain advantages in terms of producing a verdict that seems
thorough and fair. With this as a background, we are able to ask
practical questions about improving the system. These questions
might include the following:
59. For an extended discussion of the value of jury adjudication, see Wells, supra note 15, at
2390-95.
60. For example, the Massachusetts Superior Court Civil Jury Instruction for reasonable
care states "you are to determine how a person of reasonable prudence would act in these cir-
cumstances." MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.1.4 (Reasonable
Care Varies with Circumstances). Similarly there are charges that "you must then consider
whether the defendants negligent conduct caused the plaintiffs injuries." Id. § 2.1.8 (Causation).
Also the jury can be instructed that "you may infer that the occurrence was caused by negli-
gence." Id. § 2.1.10 (Res Ipsa Loquitur).
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* Is there some way to facilitate the group process that we
value in jury adjudication? Are there additional instruc-
tions or procedures that might be helpful?
" Is there anything we can do to make jury trials less cum-
bersome without undermining their advantages?
* Should we use jury trials in every tort case, or are there
cases where the additional resources they require cannot
be justified in terms of the benefits they convey?
" Since one of the chief advantages of jury trials is that
they bring the appropriate kind of closure to a disastrous
occurrence, is it not important that they take place in a
timely fashion?
* What other interests are not being served by the jury
trial? Has our desire for appropriate closure led us to
overlook the deterrence and compensation aspects of tort
law?
In some ways, these are obvious questions, but it is important to
note how different they are from those generated by the two ap-
proaches discussed earlier. They differ from those generated by the
Restatement approach in that the discussion is no longer limited to
doctrinal questions. They differ from those generated by the Com-
prehensive Normative Theory approach in that they recognize that
the rational implementation of worthy goals is only a part of what
the tort system is designed to do. In short, I believe that when we
recontextualize the tort law in this way, we shift our focus from a
limited concept of law reform to a more practical and holistic vision
for change.
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